Although there have been tremendous strides toward gender equity over the last few generations, it remains the fact that women and men tend to work in different types of jobs. The differences have narrowed over time, but the expansion and contraction of certain industries over the last five decades can likely explain some differences in men’s and women’s labor force participation.

Specifically, we have seen a long-term decline in male-dominated jobs—often jobs with higher pay thanks to higher unionization rates—alongside declines in men’s labor force participation (with the exception of the past decade). Meanwhile, female-dominated occupations are growing faster, but unfortunately many of these are currently lower-paying professions. To strengthen labor force participation, job quality and pay need to improve.

Employment losses were largest in male-dominated industries between 1976 and 2024

In a newly released report highlighting trends in men’s and women’s labor force participation, we describe how structural factors affecting industries and occupations are key to explaining historical trends in labor force growth. For men, large declines in military and manufacturing jobs went hand-in-hand with the decline in men’s labor force participation over much of the last 50 years. These were disproportionately a source of good jobs—where wage levels were high, non-wage benefits were common, and social prestige was high. Agriculture, mining, forestry, and fisheries, and wholesale trade also all experienced significant losses in employment between 1976 and 2024.

In frictionless labor markets, men should have responded to the declines in male-dominated sectors simply by moving into new jobs created outside of these sectors. But since alternative sources of employment often offered less attractive jobs for men (particularly non-college men), many men instead dropped out of the labor force entirely.

Jobs of the future are in health care and caregiving, historically female-dominated professions

By contrast, women are more likely to be employed in occupations that have grown in recent decades and are expected to keeping growing in the near future. Over the next decade, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the fastest growing occupations will be in health care support, health care practitioners, computer and mathematical sciences, and community/social services. Women dominate the workforce in three of these four growing occupations: At least 70% of the workers in health care support and community and social services occupation groups are women.

Unfortunately, jobs in which women are overrepresented tend to provide lower pay and fewer benefits than male-dominated occupations, and wages tend to fall in occupations as the share of women increases. Health care support occupations, for example, only pay about three-fourths of the median wage overall ($37,000 versus $49,000). This wage is just barely above the poverty line for a family of four.

How occupational segregation affects men’s and women’s labor market choices 

It’s possible to draw the conclusion from the information above that men will continue to lose out on labor market opportunities and women will continue to gain opportunities, albeit at low pay. But jobs in growing fields such as health care and community and social services need not be dominated by women, nor must they be poor-quality jobs. Men and women make occupational choices based on a variety of individual decisions, as well as larger social and cultural influences. These occupational choices are shaped by a lifetime of experiences, educational expectations, hiring practices, and norms and beliefs about family roles and the division of household labor, which often track women into caregiving roles and men into technology and production roles. While this “occupational segregation” can have a big impact on labor market choices, policy that improves the quality of female-dominated jobs could improve labor market outcomes for both women and men.

Improving jobs of the future can support labor force participation for both men and women

In order for these jobs of the future to be attractive for men and women alike, health care support and community and social service jobs need to pay better wages, provide better benefits, and improve working conditions. The following policy goals would all contribute to stronger labor force participation:

• Tight labor markets would not only draw more would-be workers into the labor force but also give those workers more leverage to secure better pay.
• Stronger labor standards, such as a higher minimum wage and overtime protections, would improve those jobs and make them more appealing to a broader range of workers.
• Increased unionization would also improve pay in those jobs. On average, workers in unionized jobs are paid 8% more than workers in non-union jobs. There is no reason currently low-paid occupations, like health care support jobs, couldn’t enjoy the benefits of unionization. The share of unionized workers in health care support jobs has recently increased, and their wages are higher than those of their non-union counterparts. 

The post-pandemic labor market has given us some evidence that higher pay will translate into improved labor force participation. Despite the structural headwinds to men’s labor force participation imposed by the changing industrial composition of the economy, male labor force participation rates rose significantly in the past decade (and especially in the post-2019 period) as wage growth improved significantly, particularly for non-college workers.

There is no reason that jobs of the future should have bad job quality and low pay. Given that we know which jobs the U.S. economy will need in the next 10 years, policymakers should prioritize improving the quality of these jobs to ensure all workers will access them.

Earlier this month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released preliminary benchmark revisions suggesting that job growth was only about half as fast as originally reported through much of 2024. To be clear, these revisions are not corrections of mistakes, but rather part of the regular, transparent process to update employment counts with the most comprehensive data available. In this case, the payroll employment numbers are benchmarked against unemployment insurance tax records, which represent about 97% of total employment.

It might be tempting to think that this preliminary downward revision means that the U.S. economy was much weaker than originally reported. But most of the slower job growth in 2024 was the result of smaller working-age population growth due to reduced immigration and the aging of the workforce—it was not due to degraded labor force participation or opportunities for prime-age workers in the U.S. labor market. In fact, research shows that there were about 600,000 to 900,000 fewer net immigrants between 2023 and 2024. Smaller population growth requires smaller increases in the number of jobs to maintain employment rates.

A clear way to see how the labor market stayed strong in 2024 in the face of lower job growth is to look at prime-age labor force participation, ages 25 through 54. This uses data from the Current Population Survey—which is unaffected by potential payroll revisions— and focusing on prime-age workers limits the role of the aging workforce from affecting recent trends in the data. If rates of labor force participation stay stable even as the number of jobs falls, then this implies that a reduction in labor supply has been well-absorbed by the labor market and has not translated into fewer job opportunities for the workers remaining in the U.S. economy.

Figure A shows that the prime-age labor force participation rate was higher in every month of 2024 compared with 2023. So even as payroll growth may have slowed, labor force participation grew in mid-2024 and stayed at least as high through the beginning of 2025.

Figure A

Labor force participation has stayed relatively flat in 2025, and in general most labor market indicators have remained pretty solid in 2025 compared with the longer historic record. The prime-age employment-to-population ratio is still close to its pre-pandemic level. Unemployment did increase in 2024 and 2025 but the rate is still low by historical standards.

At the same time, some indicators suggest a labor market that is softening as 2025 moves on. There has been a marked decline in payroll employment growth—averaging only 29,000 jobs per month since May. Nominal wages are still rising faster than inflation, but the pace of private-sector real wage growth is half as fast as it was three months ago. Layoffs remain low and regular state unemployment insurance claims aren’t rising, but federal unemployment insurance claims are about twice as high as they were last year at this time.

We also see troubling signs of weakness in the unemployment rates for specific demographic groups. For example, the labor market for Black workers has deteriorated in 2025. Figure B shows that Black unemployment held relatively steady in 2024, but over the last three months Black unemployment rose to 7.5%, its highest in nearly three years. The labor market experience of Black workers has often been considered a bellwether, as Black workers not only experience much worse outcomes in a downturn but also may experience that downturn first.

Figure B

Another group seeing troubling trends are young workers, those ages 16 to 24 (shown in Figure C). Although the unemployment rate for workers above the age of 25 has stayed relatively flat over the last year, the unemployment rate for young workers has been steadily rising—hitting 10.5% in August, the highest it has been in 3.5 years. Higher unemployment among young workers is also consistent with a softer hires rate, making it harder for new entrants to break into the labor market.

Figure C

Black and young workers’ labor market outcomes are more volatile because of smaller sample sizes, but the recent deterioration is hard to ignore. Because many rates in the household survey did not noticeably deteriorate in 2024, slower payroll growth in that year seemed to be driven simply by slower population growth. In 2025, however, there are now preliminary signals that job growth may be slowing enough to reflect deteriorating employment prospects for at least some groups of workers. If the latest jobs report is released on Friday (which may be delayed given the possibility of a government shutdown), we’ll track employment and unemployment rates from the household survey to see if the labor market is continuing to weaken.

This op-ed was originally published on MSNBC.com. Read the full piece here. 

Just over a week ago, President Donald Trump issued a proclamation declaring a requirement that employers pay a $100,000 fee for new H-1B visas. The announcement has created considerable outcry from employers, reflecting H-1B’s status as the country’s biggest work visa program and an important pathway for U.S. employers to hire skilled talent from abroad. To my surprise, Trump’s proclamation seemed to cite a study that I co-authored for the Economic Policy Institute, showing how some employers have taken advantage of the visa to underpay college-educated employees.

It’s true that the H-1B program is deeply flawed. But the $100,000 fee on employers won’t fix what’s wrong with the program and could have unintended consequences. Large firms and those that already pay lower wages will have less difficulty paying the fee, while startups and smaller firms that offer fair or above-market wages will struggle to pay it. Rather than the administration’s misguided and poorly implemented idea, there are much better ways to protect workers, whether they are H-1B employees or U.S.-born workers or green card holders already employed in the United States.

Read the full op-ed here. 

On March 28, Ohio Governor Mike DeWine signed an anti-diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) higher education law that regulates classroom discussions, puts diversity scholarships at risk, and largely bans diversity efforts on campus. Apart from thwarting diversity measures at public universities, the bill also prohibits faculty strikes, creates post-tenure reviews, and blocks faculty unions from negotiating on tenure—marking one of the most significant rollbacks of collective bargaining in the state in years.

The bill reflects a broader national trend: In the lead-up to the fall 2025 school year, roughly a dozen states have passed anti-DEI legislation targeting higher education, including bans on DEI offices and trainings, censorship of equity topics in classrooms, and prohibitions on diversity statements in admissions and hiring. Ohio’s case, however, highlights how this agenda evolves differently across states.

Unlike some states, Ohio has historically maintained a strong state law protecting public employees’ rights to unionize and collectively bargain—including the legally protected right to strike. And unlike many states, Ohio has never adopted anti-union so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) legislation. Indeed, past efforts to strip public employees of their collective bargaining rights (or to introduce RTW legislation) were met with intense and successful public opposition from Ohio voters. That history helps explain why legislators this year combined anti-DEI measures with new restrictions targeting only faculty unions: It is the latest variation in a decades-long pattern of conservative efforts to chip away at worker power and limit equity gains—most recently by demonizing educators and public education systems.

These recent right-wing attacks on public universities, public schools, and unions are not random; they target institutions that have historically expanded racial, gender, and economic equity for working people—which is precisely why they are under assault today.

Cost to teachers and unions

While Ohio’s legislation targets higher education faculty, K–12 unions have also been on the front lines of these fights. Teachers’ unions have been at the forefront of defending against the Trump administration’s anti-union and anti-equity policies, serving as plaintiffs in nearly a quarter of the education-related lawsuits filed this past spring. These lawsuits seek to block the administration’s efforts to dismantle the U.S. Department of Education; eliminate diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives; and bar collective bargaining for teachers at the more than 160 Department of Defense schools. On the state level, teacher unions have also been fighting to increase funding for early child care, K–12 education, and health care, and to block private school vouchers.

Given the explicit attacks on education at both the federal and state levels, educators and their unions across K–12 and higher education have been increasingly vulnerable to political and legal efforts to dictate what they can teach. In some cases, anti-equity laws are also being paired with anti-union provisions that weaken the right to collectively bargain. Earlier this year, for example, over 50 universities were under investigation from by the Department of Education for allegedly using “racial preferences and stereotypes in education programs and activities.” At the same time, K–12 teachers face the threat of losing their jobs or their schools’ state funding for using inclusive curricula that address race, gender, or sexual orientation. These efforts reflect a broader strategy by state and local governments to curb so-called “indoctrination” and censor education at every level.

In conjunction with state anti-DEI attacks, some states have taken a much bolder approach in disempowering public-sector employees and their right to unionize. This year, Utah Governor Spencer Cox signed a collective bargaining ban across all of Utah’s public sectors including education, transit, and law enforcement. Teachers—the largest group of public employees in the state—are disproportionately affected by the bill. Many educators see the measure as an effort to clear the way for an ultraconservative education agenda. The backlash has been immediate: Voters have already filed a ballot initiative to repeal the law—echoing Ohio’s 2011 SB5 fight, when an attempted rollback of strong public-sector bargaining rights was overturned at the ballot box. In recent years, Utah lawmakers have pushed to eliminate DEI programs, expand school choice vouchers, and restrict transgender bathroom access—the last of which passed earlier this year.

Across the country, state legislators have advanced broad anti-equity measures while simultaneously attempting to weaken education unions to push those agendas forward. This dual threat to public education and organized labor represents a direct attack on worker power and equity, placing both students and teachers at risk.

Undermining equity by undermining unions

Anti-equity policies will likely continue to affect postsecondary curricula, enrollment, and the strength of teachers’ unions. Of the 12 states that enacted anti-DEI legislation this year, many are also states where public-sector workers—including teachers and higher education faculty—have limited or no collective bargaining rights. Research shows that weaker bargaining protections are associated with lower union density, lower wages, and wider gender and racial pay gaps. By weakening organized labor, these policies diminish one of the strongest forces for challenging anti-equity agendas and create conditions for exclusionary laws to advance with less resistance. Across states, however, the more consistent factor is Republican-majority legislatures advancing a nationally coordinated set of anti-DEI and anti-union measures. This overlap underscores how linking attacks on equity and labor reinforces the harm inflicted in both areas.

Taken together, these efforts reveal a coordinated strategy: advancing anti-equity legislation while simultaneously undermining the unions best positioned to resist it. By weakening collective bargaining rights, lawmakers not only silence educators’ voices in shaping policy but also strip them of the power to fight for fair wages, inclusive classrooms, and supportive learning environments.

Ultimately, the erosion of both equity initiatives and labor protections jeopardizes the future of public education and public sector work. These attacks are designed not only to silence inclusive teaching and weaken unions, but also to strip away educational and economic opportunities for Black, brown, and low-income students and to erode good jobs for Black, brown, and working-class educators. Public universities, public schools, and unions have long been imperfect yet critical institutions for advancing racial and gender equity and expanding opportunity. It is precisely because of that role that they now face some of the harshest and most intertwined attacks. Protecting worker power and advancing equity are intersecting goals, and both are essential to building better schools, and a thriving economy, that serves all communities.